Energy drinks, continued
As many as 28% of college drinkers drink alcohol mixed with energy drinks in a typical month, Thombs and colleagues note.
Between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m., Thombs' team interviewed 800 patrons leaving bars in a college partying area. They asked about their drinking and about whether they intended to drive. Then they checked their breath alcohol concentration levels.
The results are sobering.
- 6.5% had drunk alcohol-energy drink combos.
- 6.6% had drunk energy drinks and alcohol, but not mixed together.
- 86% had drunk alcohol only.
- The average breath alcohol reading for those who drank energy cocktails was 0.109, higher than the legal driving limit of 0.08. The average breath alcohol concentration for those who had alcohol only was 0.081.
- Those who combined alcohol and energy drinks drank for longer periods of time.
- Patrons drinking energy cocktails left bars later than those who drank alcohol only.
"Often, students drink energy drinks because they are tired and don't start until late and want to have enough energy," Thombs tells WebMD. "They drink these before they go out. Then there's a group that combines alcohol and energy drinks; the most common is Red Bull and vodka."
The phenomenon is so common, he tells WebMD, that researchers have coined an acronym for it: AMED, for alcohol-mixed-with-energy-drinks.
Study researcher Bruce Goldberger, PhD, director of toxicology at the University of Florida, says consumers of energy drinks may drink more and misjudge their capabilities because caffeine reduces drowsiness felt by more intoxicated people.
This condition is often described as "wide awake and drunk," Goldberger says in a news release.
People often think the stimulant effect of caffeine counteracts the depressant effect of alcohol, but that's not true. Stimulants actually aggravate intoxication.
The study notes that the market for high-caffeine-content energy drinks has grown exponentially since the introduction of Red Bull in 1997. Many such energy drinks are now on the market.
The study appears in the April issue of the journal Addictive Behaviors, Vol. 35, Issue 4.
Wilson, continued
A police officer may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than required for probable cause for arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The length of a temporary detention may make an otherwise legitimate stop unreasonable. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 679, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985). However, there is no rigid, bright-line time limitation for an investigatory detention. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 679, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605; Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Instead, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern. Id. at 685. The reasonableness of the duration of a detention depends on whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Id. at 686. In determining the reasonableness of the duration of a detention, the trial and appellate courts may consider legitimate law enforcement purposes served by any delay in the officer's investigation.
Appellant maintains the Melissa police officers' detention of him, while they waited for a state trooper to administer field sobriety tests, was unreasonable. Appellant's argument is twofold. First, he suggests it was not a legitimate law enforcement purpose to detain him while the Melissa officers waited for a state trooper. Second, he contends the sheer length of the delay was unreasonable. In Belcher, the defendant was stopped for a traffic offense. Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). The police officer that stopped the defendant, Officer Willenbrock, suspected the defendant was intoxicated. Although Willenbrock was authorized to conduct DWI investigations, he called another officer, Officer Martin, who was more qualified to take over the investigation. Willenbrock waited over thirty minutes for Martin to arrive. While Willenbrock performed some minimal investigation, the reason for the delay was waiting for Martin. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that a legitimate law enforcement purpose was served by the delay because Martin was more efficient in conducting DWI investigations and could complete it more quickly.
We likewise conclude that it was a legitimate law enforcement purpose for the Melissa officers to call the state trooper so that the City of Melissa would have officers available to respond to emergency calls. We also cannot agree with appellant that the length of the time the officers waited for Lopez to was unreasonable. The evidence before the trial court regarding the length of this delay was not entirely clear. Stanley testified it took Babcock about five minutes to arrive and then Lopez an additional fifteen or twenty minutes. He however acknowledged it could have taken Lopez as long as thirty or thirty-five minutes to arrive. During this time period, contrary to appellant's assertions, some investigation did occur. Specifically, both Stanley and Babcock questioned appellant, and Babcock asked appellant for consent to search the vehicle and searched the vehicle. We cannot conclude based on the totality of the circumstances that the length of the delay was unreasonable. See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 534.
Hall, continued
Hall was charged with DWI. Before his jury trial, Hall filed a motion to suppress. He claimed that the State was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Officer Phariss had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Hall. In support of his claim, Hall cited our decision in Kelly v. State. In that case, we held that, under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the proponent of scientific evidence must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proffered evidence is reliable before it can be admitted into evidence.
During the pretrial suppression hearing, Hall expanded on the argument presented in his motion. He maintained that for the results of the LIDAR device to be admissible at trial under Kelly, a scientific expert must testify that the machine is "scientifically correct and reliable." He then asked the judge to suppress "the probable cause" and grant his suppression motion. The State responded, contending first that the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence is not applicable to motions to suppress and that the laser device does not constitute novel scientific evidence. The State also argued that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement is applicable in this case.
Testifying about his use of the LIDAR device on the night that he stopped Hall, Officer Phariss stated that, before his shift he turned on the device and that it initiated a self-test process. Officer Phariss stated that the device indicated that it passed all the "functions. Officer Phariss stated that he was not certified to use the device and that he was uncertain whether anyone maintained the device to ensure its reliability and accuracy. Finally, Officer Pharris stated that the LIDAR device provided the sole basis for stopping Hall.
Without entering any fact findings or conclusions of law, the trial judge denied Hall's motion.
The court of appeals determined that, under Rule 702, as interpreted in Kelly v. State, the State failed to prove the reliability of LIDAR technology. In making this determination, the court observed that there are no Texas authorities confirming the reliability or admissibility of LIDAR technology. As a result, the court concluded "that LIDAR technology is novel scientific evidence which may be admissible only after its reliability has been judicially determined in a "full-blown [Rule 702] 'gatekeeping' hearing under Kelly." Finally, "[n]otwithstanding the admissibility of LIDAR evidence," the court rejected the State's argument that the LIDAR device confirmed Officer Phariss's observation that Hall was speeding. Officer Phariss offered no testimony suggesting that he, independent of the LIDAR device, observed Hall speeding. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial judge "abused [his] discretion by denying Hall's pretrial suppression motion because the State failed to prove the reliability of the LIDAR technology..." As a result, the court reversed and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
We conclude that the court of appeals erred in applying Rule 702. Texas Rule of Evidence 101, which defines the title and scope of the rules, specifically provides that the Rules of Evidence, with the exception of those that concern privileges, do not apply to suppression hearings. Thus, evidence that is otherwise inadmissible at trial under the Rules of Evidence may well be admissible at a suppression hearing. So in this case, because Rule 702's requirements, as set out in Kelly, do not apply to suppression hearings, there is no threshold admissibility determination under the Rules of Evidence. Therefore, we hold that the court of appeals erred to conclude that the trial judge, in ruling on the admissibility of the LIDAR technology, as utilized in this case, was required to hold a Rule 702 Kelly gatekeeping hearing to determine the reliability of that technology.
Here, the court of appeals concluded that the State's failure to establish the reliability of LIDAR technology under Kelly resulted in the State's failure to satisfy probable cause's "reasonably trustworthy information" requirement. So while we have already concluded that the court of appeals erred to require a Kelly hearing, we must ask whether it erred in holding that the trial judge's decision to deny Hall's suppression motion was wrong. We conclude that the court of appeals did not err. First, as noted by the court of appeals, there was no evidence that the LIDAR device was used to confirm Officer Phariss's independent, personal observation that Hall was speeding. Second, the record reveals that there was absolutely no evidence to show that use of LIDAR technology to measure speed supplies reasonably trustworthy information or that the trial judge took judicial notice of this fact, as well as his basis for doing so. As a result, the State failed to establish that Officer Phariss, who relied solely on LIDAR technology to conclude that Hall was speeding, had probable cause to stop Hall. Our holding today is limited to the facts of this case.